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bstract: This study examines whether Canadian govern-
ments have adapted budgets for the ageing population in 
accordance with norms of intergenerational justice. Public 
finance data in 2016 are analysed compared to 1976 in 
light of three constructs: the elderly/non-elderly ratio of social spend-
ing change, intergenerational reciprocity, and ability to pay. Findings 
include that (i) governments increased per capita spending for seniors 
4.2 times faster than for those under the age of 45; (ii) public finance 
requires younger Canadians to contribute 22%-62% more in income 
taxes for the elderly now by comparison with 1976; and (iii) the con-
temporary ageing population has a greater ability to pay than cohorts 
immediately before and after them.
Keywords: Taxes, Government Expenditures, Generational Equity, 
Housing Wealth, Public Reporting
Canada, like many countries, is ageing. Seniors represent 16.5% 
of the population, up from 8.7% in 1976.1 In countries experienc-
ing such trends, there are worries about “bankruptcy for publicly 
funded health care and pension systems […], unfair treatment 
of children vis-à-vis the elderly […] and the burdening of future 
generations” (Lee/Mason 2011: 3). Canada is no exception. The 
federal government has made, and repealed, changes to the age 
of eligibility for Old Age Security. Provincial premiers launched 
a Task Force on Aging, and the national social science agency pri-
oritised the research question “What are the future implications 
of state regulation from cradle to grave?” that arise from “Life 
cycle issues… challenging society.”2 This study helps to answer 
the question by reviewing the evolution of key age-related policies 
in Canadian public finance over the last four decades in light of 
norms of intergenerational justice.
Several recent comparative public finance studies about genera-
tional equity include Canada (Tepe/Vanhuysse 2010; Bradshaw/
Holmes 2013). The most sophisticated is by Vanhuysse (2013), 
who finds that Canada is among the worst 9 of 29 nations for 
intergenerational justice. Generally, even the strongest compara-
tive studies omit spending on medical care, tax expenditures, and 
sometimes even education, which undermine their utility.3 In re-
sponse, more scholars are producing country-specific analyses.4 
For example, the anthology by Lee and Mason features over 20 
single country studies in recognition that “designing effective pol-
icy […] is a complex, detailed, and inherently country-level task 
that is best carried out one country at a time” (Lee/Mason 2011: 
30). I design this study accordingly.
Generational equity in public finance received substantial atten-
tion in the 1990s when funding for the Canada and Quebec Public 
Pensions (C/QPP) factored prominently in public debate. Much 
of this work responded to Oreopoulos and Kotlikoff (1996), 
who estimated that total government spending in 1995 re-
quired taxes of future generations that were twice what current 
 generations were paying. Following government adaptations 
to the C/QPP, Statistics Canada published an anthology edit-
ed by Corak (1998). This included an updated study by Oreo-
poulos and Vaillaincourt (1998), who concluded that spending 
cuts, tax increases and revisions to C/QPP between 1995 and 
1998 restored balance to tax collection between contemporary 
and future generations. By 1999, total government revenue 
collection was 43.6% of GDP, while total expenditure was 
41.9%.5 There has been little analysis of generational fairness in 
Canadian public finance since then, and no government rou-
tinely reports on this theme. Given that government revenue fell 
4.7% of GDP in the subsequent years, while expenditure dropped 
only 1.7%,6 it is timely to revisit questions about intergeneration-
al justice.
This article has five sections. I begin by summarising the theoreti-
cal framework and methods, focusing on three constructs that are 
common in the literature: the elderly/non-elderly spending ratio; 
intergenerational reciprocity; and the ability to pay of different 
age cohorts. Sections 2 to 4 apply the constructs to analysis of Ca-
nadian data. These data provide evidence that Canadian govern-
ments did not prioritise intergenerational justice over the last four 
decades and, as discussed in the final section, illuminate oppor-
tunities to rebalance public finance between the young and aged.
Theoretical framework and methods
Guided by the United Nations’ vision of a society for all ages,7 
I focus on whether governments budget for all ages, drawing on 
population health scholarship. A robust scientific literature reveals 
that health does not start with health care. It starts with the social 
determinants of health where we are born, grow, live, work and 
age.8 These include the distribution of wealth, income, education, 
employment, housing, human impact on the climate, and the 
government policies that shape these other determinants. Biologi-
cal sensitivity to the social determinants is particularly strong dur-
ing our earliest years (Commission on the Social Determinants 
of Health 2008: chapter 5; Keating/Hertzman 1999). As a result, 
budgeting for all ages requires legislators to promote “health in all 
policies” in recognition that health promotion is the domain of 
social, economic and environmental ministries, whereas medical 
ministries treat illness more than they prevent it (Commission on 
the Social Determinants of Health 2008: chapter 10; Kershaw 
2018).
I operationalise the concept of budgeting for all ages in three stag-
es. First, following the path-breaking scholarship of Lynch (2006: 
20) and Vanhuysse (2013), I calculate the elderly/non-elderly ratio 
of spending changes over the last four decades. For the elderly, I 
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examine spending on retirement income and medical care. For 
non-elderly, I prioritise programmes that invest in generations 
raising young children, because epigenetics literature reveals op-
portunities to advance life-long health by investing in this demo-
graphic (Keating/Hertzman 1999; Boyce 2007). In accordance 
with Kershaw and Anderson (2016), I conceive of this age group 
as those under the age of 45,9 and focus on childcare services, 
parental leave, cash supports for families with children, education 
and medical care. These represent major policies by which govern-
ments can adapt costs for younger generations, although it is not 
an exhaustive list.
I calculate changes in spending on programmes for 2016 com-
pared to 1976, and interpret these in the light of revenue changes 
over the same period. Aggregate and per capita figures are assessed. 
All expenditures are adjusted for inflation and economic growth 
using consumer price index10 and gross domestic product (GDP) 
data available at Statistics Canada. 1976 is selected for compar-
ison, because it marks the beginning of the five-year period in 
which the largest part of the Baby Boom generation (born 1946-
64) came of age as young adults. I thus examine government 
spending at two pivotal stages for Boomers: when raising children 
40 years ago, to which I compare public finance now for Canadi-
ans under 45, a cohort that includes many of their children; and 
now at retirement, to which I compare spending 40 years ago for 
the cohort of seniors that included many of their parents.
The second stage of analysis digs further into revenue collection 
to explore the intergenerational golden rule recommended by 
Wolfson et al. (1998: 108). With roots in reciprocity theories 
of intergenerational justice (Gosseries 2009), this norm implies 
that “one generation, when it becomes old and frail, should not 
expect to be treated any better by its children than it treated its 
parents’ generation in their old age” (Wolfson et al. 1998: 108). 
I examine this theme by calculating income taxes owed by rep-
resentative 35 year-olds, measuring the amount of taxes paid to 
medical care and Old Age Security for contemporary seniors. I 
then repeat the tax calculations for inflation-adjusted incomes in 
1976 to assess whether young taxpayers today pay more, or less, 
for programmes targeting the elderly by comparison with when 
today’s elderly were young. I use Statistics Canada’s Social Policy 
Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) to calculate taxes. It 
is widely used to analyse the financial interactions of governments 
and individuals in Canada.11
The third stage of analysis examines whether generations come of 
age in more, or less, advantageous circumstances, with unearned 
implications for their relative need or ability to pay. I refer to this 
theme as the lottery of timing, which is important to scholars of in-
tergenerational justice who build on the tradition of Rawls (Rawls 
1971: section 44). Behind a veil of ignorance where parties do not 
know if they will inherit poor or affluent circumstances or to what 
generation they may belong, Rawls judges that the obligations of 
one generation to save on behalf of successors or invest in elders 
will vary in proportion to the epochal conditions in which they 
live. This insight anticipates that it may be appropriate for a gen-
eration to pay more in taxes or transfers than its predecessors, if 
that generation inherits more affluence than did its parents. I an-
alyse this theme by reporting on indicators selected by Vanhuysse 
(2013) for his Intergenerational Justice Index. I pay additional at-
tention to earnings relative to housing costs, and explore implica-
tions for wealth accumulation. Ultimately, the third stage invites 
evaluation of whether intergenerational adaptations in public fi-
nance are made in proportion to the social determinants of health 
faced contemporarily by different age cohorts, as well as relative 
to the advantages and disadvantages inherited by those cohorts.12
Spending on the elderly and on those under the age of 45: 
1976 and 2016
This section describes changes in public spending by all levels of 
Canadian government for citizens aged 65+ and under the age 
of 45 in 2016 by comparison with 1976 (see Table 1). Almost 
all spending comes from general revenue, which grew by $11.3 
billion in 2016.13 The Canada and Quebec Public Pensions (C/
QPP) are the exception, with separate revenue streams to which 
citizens prepay for later benefits. C/QPP revenue had increased 
$36.5 billion by 2016. 
As general revenue hovered around 35% of GDP in both years, 
governments increased spending for seniors on medical care by 
$36.1 billion in 2016,14 and Old Age Security (OAS) by $4.9 
billion.15 OAS spending grew little, because retirement income 
spending grew primarily in the C/QPP, which surged by $48.5 
billion.16 The $91.6 billion increase in spending (half from gener-
al revenue) partly reflects there are 4 million more seniors today 
than in 1976, as the population aged 65+ increased from 8.7% 
to 16.5%.
Substantial demographic changes among younger Canadians, 
however, did not drive comparably large aggregate expenditure in-
creases. For example, 4.6 million more Canadians under 45 now 
have post-secondary credentials than in 1976, as graduation from 
university, college or trades increased from 28% to 70% for peo-
ple aged 25-44.17 But post-secondary spending remained relative-
ly flat over the two years, up $2.7 billion.18 Similarly, 2.3 million 
more women aged 25-44 are in the labour force, as their partic-
ipation increased from 54% in 1976 to 83% in 2016.19 Despite 
the resulting increase in demand for child care, annual spending 
on this budget line grew just $3.6 billion.20 Such comparisons 
reveal that substantial new spending on the ageing population 
reflects factors beyond demography,21 since other comparable 
demographic changes did not motivate similarly-sized spending 
increases.22
As spending on seniors from general revenue increased four times 
more than revenue, governments dealt with resulting budget 
shortfalls in two ways. They increased the debt/GDP ratio by half 
a trillion dollars,23 and reduced spending elsewhere. Reductions 
Canadian governments did not prioritise intergenera-
tional justice over the last four decades.
[I]t may be appropriate for a generation to pay more in 
taxes or transfers than its predecessors, if that genera-
tion inherits more affluence than did its parents.
As general revenue hovered around 35% of GDP in both 
years, governments increased spending for seniors 
on medical care by $36.1 billion in 2016, and Old Age 
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Total 
taxes
Age 35 
income 
percentile 2016 income
Average 
rate $ amount
% of total 
taxes $ amount
% of total 
taxes $ amount
Average 
rate $ amount
% of 
Total 
Taxes $ amount
% of total 
taxes $ amount $ change % change
25th 24,797       9.2% 2,283       5.0% 114           5.4% 123         237              10.3% 2,554       9.2% 236         5.8% 149           385           271 147            62%
50th 45,570       17.6% 8,022       5.0% 400           5.4% 434         834              14.9% 6,778       9.2% 626         5.8% 395           1,021        -1,244 187            22%
75th 71,274       23.1% 16,436     5.0% 820           5.4% 889         1,709           20.3% 14,437     9.2% 1,333      5.8% 840           2,174        -1,999 465            27%
99th 203,506     38.1% 77,449     5.0% 3,863        5.4% 4,189      8,052           35.8% 72,930     9.2% 6,736      5.8% 4,246        10,982      -4,519 2,929         36%
1976 2016 2016 minus 1976
Total Taxes
Taxes to medical for  
age 65+
Taxes to OAS for 
age 65+
Total $ to 
medical & 
OAS
Total $ to medical & 
OAS for age 65+
Total $ to 
medical & 
OAS
 Total taxes
Taxes to medical      
for age 65+
Taxes to OAS  for age 
65+
Table 1: Change in the government spending on the elderly and on those under the age of 45: 1976 to 2016
Table 2: Income taxes paid, 1976 vs 2016, by 2016 income percentiles (2016$)
1976 2016
Female 
LFP
Postsec 
Enrol
* 
Growth
%GDP $ millions 1976 2016 /pop *LFP *Postsec *1.54 2016 w/o Growth * Growth
GDP ($ millions, per capita) 205,123        2,027,544      36,196       55,876         
Revenue 
  Total Gov't General Revenue                                                                                                                                                                                         34.99% 35.55% 0.56% 11,349 23,397,056        36,286,425 12,666       19,553         19,866         7,200 313
  CPP/QPP Revenue 1.60% 3.39% 1.80% 36,483 23,397,056         36,286,425        577            891              1,897           1,319 1,005
  Total 36.59% 38.95% 2.36% 47,832 23,397,056         36,286,425        13,243       20,444         21,762         8,519 1,318
Spending 65+
 From general revenue
  Medical care to 65+ 1.94% 1.88% 38,108 8,322         12,847         4,591 66
    sensitivity analysis 1.79% 2.03% 41,089 7,690         11,871         5,223 1,042
  OAS 2.10% 2.34% 0.24% 4,947 1,969,837           5,990,511          9,023         13,929         7,929           -1,094 -6,000
  General revenue Subtotal 4.03% 6.16% 2.12% 43,056 17,345       26,776         20,842         3,497 -5,933
 From C/QPP Revenue 0.54% 2.93% 2.39% 48,501 1,969,837           5,990,511          2,303         3,556           9,910           7,606 6,354
  Total 4.57% 9.09% 4.52% 91,556 1,969,837           5,990,511          19,648       30,331         30,752         11,104 420
Spending  <45
  Child care services 16,987,225         20,216,021        25              38           59 226              188 167
      sensitivity analysis 4,585,620           4,700,034          92              141         218              972              831 754
  Parental leave 16,987,225         20,216,021        35              53           83 190              136 107
      sensitivity analysis 705,802              784,192             837            1,287      1,986           4,887           3,601 2,901
  Family income support 0.95% 1.04% 0.09% 1,790
 <age 45 from 72% to 56%              
Consistent enrolment rate 16,987,225         20,216,021        472            729              1,038           566 309
  Elementary & Secondary 16,987,225         20,216,021        2,352         3,630           3,314           962 -316
      sensitivity analysis 5,634,883           5,110,835          7,089         10,944         13,109         6,020 2,165
  Post-secondary 16,987,225         20,216,021        1,095         2,725     4,207           2,338           -387 -1,869
      sensitivity analysis 9,593,025           13,144,475        1,940         4,826     7,450           3,596           -1,230 -3,854
  Medical care  <45 2.29% 0.01% 297 1,143         1,764           1,171 550
    sensitivity analysis 2.40% -0.09% -1,799 1,194         1,844           1,120 470
  Total 10.27% 9.39% -0.88% -17,857 16,987,225         20,216,021        5,122         6,784     10,472         9,420           2,637 -1,052
Debt 19.20% 43.88% 24.68% 500, 405 23,397,056         36,286,425        6,951         10,730         24,521         17,570 13,790
2.49       
2.31%
 <age 45 from 72% to 56%              
Consistent enrolment rate. Per 
capita use up 102% 
16,987,225         20,216,021        
2.20% 0.13% 2,721
2,314           
4.72% 3.30% -1.41% -28,643  0.5 million fewer students
Consistent enrolment rate 
 4.6 million more grads, from 28% 
to 70% of 25-44 yrs 2.33%
1.54        
0.12% 2,418
2016/1976 ratio
0.05%
0.07% 1.54        
3,559
 2.3 million more women <45 in 
LF, up from 54% to 83% 
0.23% 0.18%
0.19%
3.82% 1,969,837           5,990,511          
 Population grows from  
23.4 million to 36.3 million.              
GDP/person grows 54% 
 4.0 million more seniors,        up 
from from 8.7% to 16.5% of 
population.
Consistent enrolment rate in 
programmes. Per capita use of 
medical spending up 55% 
Aggregate 1976 spending         
before adjusting for Growth 2016 minus 1976
Aggregate spending Major demographic changes Spending per capita 2016$
2016 minus 1976 Population
12,913         
Sources: Population data from Statistics Canada (2017a): CANSIM Table 051-0001; Revenue, OAS, C/QPP, Family income from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM Table 380-0080; GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063; Medical care data from CIHI 2017: Tables A.3.3.1, E.1.18.2 and E.1.1.2; Childcare from Government of BC 1977: D.41; and 
Friendly et al. 2015: 136; Parental leave from Canadian Tax Foundation (1979): Table 7-9; and Government of Canada (n.d.): Chart 2; Elementary & Secondary data from Statistics Canada (2017d): CANSIM Table 478-0014; Post-secondary spending data from Statistics Canada (2018d): CANSIM Table 380-0081; 2016 post-secondary utilisation data from Statistics Canada (2017b): 
1976 data from Statistics Canada 1978a, 1978b; Female labour force data from Statistics Canada (2017c): CANSIM Table 282-0002; Debt data from Statistics Canada (n.d. a): CANSIM Table 378-0073 and (2018e): CANSIM Table 378-0121; Inflation adjustment data from Statistics Canada (2018c): CANSIM Table 326-0021.
Sources: Income percentile data from Statistics Canada (n.d. b): Data Table, Total Income percentiles. Taxes are author calculations using Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) versions 8.1 and 26.1. All assumptions and interpretations are the responsibility of the author.
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include a $28 billion decline in spending on grade (elementary 
and secondary) school as the number of school-age children fell 
by half a million.24 While some of this reduction may be inter-
preted to pay for the small spending increases for post-secondary 
and child care discussed above, as well as cash transfers to families 
(up $1.8 billion) (Statistics Canada 2018), parental leave (up $2.4 
billion),25 and medical care for those under 45 (up $297 million), 
most of the grade school reduction was reallocated elsewhere. In 
total, the suite of programmes on which younger Canadians rely 
fell by $17.9 billion.
Aggregate public finance trends need interpretation in light of 
per capita figures. Alas, Canadian governments do not publish 
age analyses of per capita spending. Kershaw and Anderson fill 
this gap, finding all levels of government combine to allocate 
over $33,000 per person aged 65+ by comparison with less than 
$12,000 per person for those under the age of 45 (Kershaw/
Anderson 2016). Unfortunately, data are not available to repli-
cate their comprehensive analysis for 1976. To examine change 
over time, I instead analyse per capita budgeting for the policies 
featured above, adjusting first for inflation, and then economic 
growth. It is necessary to separate these factors to reveal how gov-
ernments invested the proceeds from growth, with options in-
cluding further investment in well-established programmes, like 
medical care or post-secondary; growing a nascent programme, 
like child care; or reducing tax rates.
The Canadian population increased from 23.4 million to 36.3 
million since 1976.26 Per capita general revenue increased $7,200 
by 2016, while funds for C/QPP increased by $1,319.27 Over the 
same period, GDP per person rose 54%, or nearly $20,000.28 This 
means total general revenue per person increased by $313 beyond 
the rate of growth, as did C/QPP revenue by $1,005.
Per capita spending on medical care and retirement income for 
Canadians aged 65+ increased by $11,104 since 1976,29 whereas 
per capita spending on programmes for Canadians under the age 
of 45 grew by $2,637. As a result, the elderly/non-elderly (un-
der-age-45) ratio in change of spending is 4.2 to 1.30 This ratio 
signals that Canadian governments prioritized per capita spend-
ing increases for the ageing population at a rate that is over four 
times faster than for citizens under 45.
The per capita increase for Canada’s 6.0 million seniors is 57% 
higher than the $19,468 per capita spending in 1976, which rep-
resents an increase that is slightly faster than economic growth 
($420/senior). The increase for each of the 20.2 million Canadi-
ans under the age of 45 is 39% higher than the $6,784 per cap-
ita spending in 1976, approximately 71% of economic growth. 
The slower rate of increase by comparison with economic growth 
represents $1,052 less per person for the under-45s as of 2016 
– or $21.3 billion less when multiplied by all the people in the 
age group. This sum represents enough to fund, for example, a 
high-quality, universal childcare programme twice over (Ker-
shaw/Anderson 2009), or a 46% increase to the post-secondary 
budget.31
Of the new spending on seniors, the $4,591 increase in medical 
care spending per person aged 65+ is notable for two reasons. 
First, it is 74% larger than the entire increase per person under the 
age of 45 for child care, parental leave, family income support, ed-
ucation and medical spending. Second, additional medical spend-
ing comes from general revenue, whereas increases to retirement 
income come from C/QPP. Canadians prepay the latter, meaning 
that the larger benefits now enjoyed by seniors partly reflect their 
larger contributions than past generations. This is not the case for 
larger medical expenditures, which taxpayers fund in response to 
annual demand. Since Canadian data show demand rises as indi-
viduals age,32 I explore the implication for taxes paid by younger 
Canadians now versus the past when examining the intergenera-
tional golden rule.
Post-secondary expenditures represent the largest per capita 
 decline for younger Canadians: down $387 from 1976 after in-
flation, and down $1,869 compared to economic growth projec-
tions.33 Per capita medical care spending is also noteworthy, be-
cause it is the largest increase (up $1,171) for young people, rising 
$550 faster than economic growth would predict. Since social 
spending in Canada correlates with improvements in life expec-
tancy and preventable mortality more so than medical spending 
(Dutton et al. 2018), this allocation likely compromises young 
people’s wellbeing. Budgeting for all ages requires concern for the 
ratio between social and medical spending given the extensive 
 scientific literature that finds health begins where we are born, 
grow, live, work and age – not with medical spending (Kershaw 
2018).34
Some may worry the population under the age of 45 is too large 
a denominator to provide adequate comparisons between spend-
ing on seniors and younger people. I therefore perform sensitivity 
analyses reported in Table 1, beginning by apportioning childcare 
spending entirely to those under the age of 12 to find a per capita 
increase of $831. When post-secondary spending is allocated only 
to those age 18-45, there is a per capita reduction of $1,230. If 
parental leave spending is assigned just to children under the age 
of 1 and a primary caregiver, the per capita increase is $3,601. If 
grade school spending is assumed to benefit only children aged 
5-17, not parental labour force attachment, the per capita increase 
is $6,020.35 This latter change is of the same magnitude as the 
$4,591 increase in medical care per senior, or $6,513 combined 
increased to C/QPP and OAS. As such, the $29 billion reduction 
to aggregate grade school funding (measured as %GDP) is small-
er than would have been expected from the drop in school-age 
population.
[S]ubstantial new spending on the ageing population 
reflects factors beyond demography, since other compa-
rable demographic changes did not motivate similarly-      
sized spending increases.
As spending on seniors from general revenue increased 
four times more than revenue, governments dealt with 
resulting budget shortfalls in two ways. They increased 
the debt/GDP ratio by half a trillion dollars, and reduced 
spending elsewhere. Reductions include a $28 billion 
decline in spending on grade school as the number of 
school-age children fell by half a million.
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Intergenerational golden rule: evolution in taxes paid by 
younger citizens
The previous section reveals that governments increased per capita 
spending for seniors 4.2 times faster than for Canadians under 
the age of 45, as spending increased beyond the rate of economic 
growth for seniors, but slower for young people. In this section, 
I examine implications for individual taxes owed by young peo-
ple, guided by the intergenerational golden rule introduced in the 
methods section. All else being equal, it implies elderly Canadians 
today should expect transfers from their offspring that are on a par 
with transfers they made as young adults to their parents’ genera-
tion when elderly (Wolfson et al. 1998: 108).
To explore this concept, I examine total income taxes paid by a 
young person in 2016 compared to 1976, along with the sub-to-
tal paid to medical care for seniors and OAS.36 I refer to simulated 
35-year-olds with incomes from employment that represent the 
25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentiles in 2016,37 and adjust these for 
inflation to calculate federal and provincial taxes owed in 1976 
and today.38 From the diversity of provincial tax codes, I select 
Ontario because it is the largest province.
There are two broad findings, summarised in Table 2. First, in-
come taxes owed in 2016 are generally lower than in 1976, with 
average tax rates down 2-3 percentage points. Low-income earn-
ers are the exception for whom the average tax rate is now one 
percentage point higher. Whereas an earner at the 25th percentile 
pays $271 more in income taxes today, the median earner pays 
$1,244 less, the 75th percentile pays $1,999 less, and the top one 
per cent pays $4,519 less. This finding signals there is less progres-
sivity in Canada’s income tax code now than four decades ago. 
Tax rates are lower for middle and higher earners today while still 
generating more revenue as a share of the economy, because GDP 
per capita increased 54% over the period.
Second, as taxes generally fell, the amount of taxes paid on behalf of 
seniors increased. 5% of total government revenue went to medical 
care for seniors in 1976; now 9.2% does. The revenue share for 
OAS rose more modestly from 5.4% to 5.8%.39 Given these chang-
es, a 35 year-old at the 25th percentile now pays $147 more a year 
to medical care for seniors and OAS than in 1976, equal to a 62% 
increase. A median earner adds $187 (up 22%); an earner at the 
75th percentile contributes an extra $465 (up 27%); and a young 
person in the top one per cent pays an extra $2,929 (up 36%).40
These findings reveal that the cohort retiring today expects more 
in taxation from its children than it paid for its parents’ gener-
ation when elderly. In addition, lower average tax rates permit 
some citizens aged 65+ to pay less in tax toward their offspring 
than their elderly parents contributed toward them in 1976. The 
two trends erode government fiscal capacity to invest in – or mit-
igate the risks facing – contemporary younger cohorts.
The lottery of timing: variations in ability to pay among age 
cohorts
The first two stages of analysis reveal that governments used the 
proceeds from economic growth to (i) raise per capita spending 
on Canadians aged 65+ over four times faster than for citizens 
 under 45; and (ii) reduce tax rates, while requiring younger 
Canadians to contribute more in income taxes for elderly citi-
zens now by comparison with 1976. The final stage of analysis 
invites questions about the fairness of these public finance pat-
terns. Since some are born into favourable eras, and others are 
not, scholars of justice like Rawls (1971: section 44) signal it is 
important to examine intergenerational public finances by refer-
ence to the standard of living inherited by different age groups, 
and the socioeconomic circumstances they currently face. In re-
sponse, I now consider how the standard of living for contempo-
rary seniors compares with that of elderly Canadians four decades 
earlier; and how the standard of living four decades earlier when 
contemporary seniors were young adults compares with that of 
young people today.
I follow Vanhuysse’s Intergenerational Justice Index to examine 
this theme, starting with his focus on child and elderly poverty 
rates (Vanhuysse 2013).
Canada has two low-income measures that date back to 1976. The 
first is the low-income cut-off (LICO), which measures the share 
of residents who spend 20% more on food, shelter and clothing 
than the average size-adjusted family. The second is a low-income 
measure (LIM), which measures the proportion of residents who 
fall below 50% of median adjusted income.41 The after-tax LICO 
shows reductions in low-income for both children (under 18) and 
the elderly (65+) since 1976: dropping from 13.4% to 7.3% for 
children in 2016, and from 29% to 4.7% for seniors. By contrast, 
the LIM shows little change in low-income for children: 14.3% 
in 1976 and 14.0% in 2016. For seniors, the LIM dropped from 
30.6% to 14.2%. Both metrics convey a substantial shift in the 
ratio of child/elderly low-income. Whereas children had less than 
half the rate of low-income of elderly Canadians in 1976 on both 
This shift in economic insecurity aligns with other 
income and wealth changes that signal prosperity more 
generally shifted from younger to older Canadians.
[T]he elderly/non-elderly (under-age-45) ratio in change 
of spending is 4.2 to 1. This ratio signals that Canadian 
governments prioritised per capita spending increases 
for the ageing population at a rate that is over four 
times faster than for citizens under 45.
Table 3: Median total income 2016$, by age, 1976 and 2016
All earners Full-time earners only
Age 1976-80 2012-2016 2012-2016 minus 1976-1980 % change 1976-80 2012-2016 2012-2016 minus 1976-1980 % change
25-34 41,720      36,640           -5,080 -12% 53,040       49,200           -3,840 -7%
35-44        46,980             46,340 -640 -1%         60,140            59,740 -400 -1%
45-54 44,800      45,880           1,080 2% 57,740       59,880           2,140 4%
55-64 34,200      39,180           4,980 15% 53,400       56,920           3,520 7%
65-plus 14,420      26,900           12,480 87% 43,160       57,540           14,380 33%
Sources: All earners: Statistics Canada (2018g): CANSIM Table 206-0052; Full-time earners: Statistics Canada (n.d. d): Custom Table C856285.
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measures, now they have the same rate when measured by the 
LIM, and 155% of the rate when measured by the LICO.42
This shift in economic insecurity aligns with other income and 
wealth changes that signal prosperity more generally shifted from 
younger to older Canadians. Table 3 shows that median income 
fell $5,080 (-12%) for Canadians age 25-34 since 1976-80, and 
down $640 (-1%) for those age 35-44.43 The decline persists after 
controlling for the evolution in part-time work and post-second-
ary enrolment by measuring only full-time, full-year earners, for 
whom median income is down $3,840 and $400 respectively.44 
Over the same period, median income rose over $12,000 for 
 Canadians aged 65+ (up 87% for all earners, and 33% for full-
time earners).45
As earnings fell for young Canadians, their primary cost of living 
surged. Whereas an average home cost $210,089 in 1976, the 
price had reached $490,495 by 2016.46 The ratio of median full-
time income for a 25-34 year-old relative to average home cost 
therefore increased from 4:1 to 10:1.47 This young person must 
now work 13.4 years to save a 20% down payment on an aver-
age home, up from five years in 1976-80.48 Even with historically 
low interest rates, the typical 25-34 year-old must make mortgage 
payments that are 15% higher now than in 1976-1980.49 Average 
rents have also increased in large urban centres.50
While escalating home prices require more work of young people 
(and all renters), they shift housing wealth from younger to older 
Canadians. Price escalation increased net wealth in owner-occu-
pied principal residences by $2.6 trillion since 1976.51 Table 4 
shows that 5% of the additional wealth is owned by households 
under the age of 35, which represent 29% of the adult popula-
tion. One-third of the additional wealth is owned by Canadians 
aged 65+, who make up 21% of the adult population. Given low-
er ownership rates for younger Canadians,52 the typical household 
headed by an adult under 35 faces higher rents without reaping 
wealth gains from rising prices. By contrast, Table 5 shows that 
the typical senior household reports an increase of $277,903 in 
net housing wealth by comparison with the same age group in 
1977.53
Vanhuysse (2013) supplements metrics about private income 
trends for different age cohorts with two metrics for public space. 
The first is debt per younger person,54 which increased from 
$14,779 per person under the age of 45 in 1976 to $44,013.55 
The second is the ecological footprint per capita, which measures 
how much demand human consumption places on the biosphere. 
At present, a footprint of 1.7 global hectares per person is nec-
essary if each global citizen is to live within the means of our 
planet’s resources (Global Footprint Network 2018). In 1976, the 
Canadian ecological footprint per person was 10.3 global hec-
tares. As of 2014, it was 8.0 global hectares, the seventh largest on 
the planet (Global Footprint Network 2018). This change signals 
that Canadians reduced our footprint on average by 0.06 hectares 
per year since 1976. To achieve 1.7 global hectares by mid-centu-
ry, a key time commitment in the Paris Agreement (United Na-
tions 2015), Canadians must now accelerate threefold the pace at 
which we reduce our footprint to 0.18 hectares per year.56
In sum, findings from this third analysis suggest today’s ageing 
population has “lucked out” in the lottery of timing by compar-
ison with those who preceded and follow them, and thus enjoy 
a greater ability to pay, or lesser need. Seniors today have more 
prosperity on average than did elderly Canadians four decades 
ago. They have lower levels of poverty, higher median earnings, 
and more wealth in their homes.
Older Canadians today also generally faced more favourable so-
cioeconomic circumstances as younger adults in 1976 than do 
Table 4: Total net value in Canadian principal residences, by age: 1977 vs 2016
As earnings fell for young Canadians, their primary cost 
of living surged. Whereas an average home cost $210,089 
in 1976, the price reached $490,495 by 2016. The ratio of 
median full-time income for a 25-34 year-old relative to 
average home cost therefore increased from 4:1 to 10:1.
Housholds, by age 
of primary earner
% home 
owners
Market value 
minus 
mortgage ($)
Mortgage 
debt ($)
% home 
owners
Market 
value minus 
mortgage 
($)
Mortgage 
debt ($)
Change in 
% home 
owners
Change in 
market 
value 
minus 
mortgage 
Change in 
mortgage 
debt ($)
Change in 
debt for  
extra $1 of 
net value 
($)
under 35 41% 81,219           76,468     35% 185,552    214,248    -14% 104,333   137,780    1.32         
35-44 73% 130,164         51,131     64% 255,975    204,025    -12% 125,811   152,895    1.22         
45-54 74% 156,785         29,471     70% 377,000    143,900    -6% 220,215   114,429    0.52         
55-64 70% 151,297         12,579     77% 381,852    76,348      10% 230,555   63,769      0.28         
65+ 63% 131,568         3,194       67% 409,471    22,529      7% 277,903   19,335      0.07         
1977 (all $ adjusted to 2016) 2016 2016 minus 1977
Sources: 1977 data: Statistics Canada (1977): Survey of Consumer Finance Micro Data File; 2016 data: Statistics Canada (2017g): CANSIM Table 205-0002.
Housholds, by 
age of primary 
earner
Home 
ownership rate
Total market value 
minus total mortgage 
debt (millions $)
Share of total net 
value in principal 
residences
Home 
ownership 
rate
Total market value 
minus total mortgage 
debt (millions $)
Share of total net 
value in principal 
residences
% change in 
rate of home 
owners
Change in total market value 
minus total mortgage debt 
(millions $)
% change in share of 
total net value in 
principal residences
under 35 41% 92,604 15% 35% 223,080 7% -14% 130,476 -55%
35-44 73% 130,182 22% 64% 439,867 14% -12% 309,685 -37%
45-54 74% 146,923 24% 70% 757,038 24% -6% 610,115 -3%
55-64 70% 119,951 20% 77% 832,780 26% 10% 712,829 30%
65+ 63% 114,459 19% 67% 965,077 30% 7% 850,618 58%
Total 604,119 3,217,842 2,613,722 
1977 ($ adjusted to 2016) 2016 2016 minus 1977
Sources: 1977 data: Statistics Canada (1977): Survey of Consumer Finance Micro Data File; 2016 data: Statistics Canada (2017g): CANSIM Table 205-0002.
Table 5: Mean change in individual household net housing value and mortgage debt, by age: 1977 vs 2016
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younger Canadians now. Older Canadians started with higher 
median earnings, which could stretch further when paying for 
rent, saving for a down payment, and paying a mortgage. Today’s 
seniors also inherited smaller government debts as young people, 
and reduced their ecological footprint at just one-third of the rate 
that young adults must now do. As a counterpoint to this general 
trend, 1976 witnessed higher rates of low-income among children 
when measured by the LICO, but not the LIM.
It is relative to this lottery of timing that the justness of public 
finance trends can begin to be assessed. Three findings give reason 
to worry that Canadian governments strayed from norms of in-
tergenerational justice since 1976. First, governments invested in 
later life course stages at a rate that is 4.2 times faster than for ear-
lier life course stages, and did so on behalf of a cohort that enjoyed 
more affluence by comparison with cohorts that preceded and fol-
lowed them. Second, governments violated the intergenerational 
golden rule. Younger Canadians now transfer 22%-62% more in 
income taxes to elderly citizens than today’s seniors contributed 
to their forebears, even though contemporary young people have 
a lesser ability to pay. Third, the interaction of the first two trends 
crowd out resources to support younger people to adapt to new 
risks, including lower earnings, higher costs, less time at home 
when children are young, and climate change.
Since life expectancy at birth for Canadians aged 25 in 1976 is 
7 to 10 years higher than for Canadians aged 65 in 1976,57 time 
comparisons of spending on seniors are difficult to interpret. 
Some may judge that contemporary older Canadians must finan-
cially manage more birthdays than did seniors in the past, and 
thus have greater need. Some may judge that additional birthdays 
ahead of contemporary seniors mean they are “younger,” less frail, 
and thus have a greater ability to pay (Sanderson/Scherbov 2008). 
However one aligns with these perspectives, the data from this 
study invite public dialogue about whether Canadian public fi-
nance has found the right balance in adapting for older Canadians 
in proportion to the initial circumstances they inherited, and to 
new realities now facing them and younger citizens. This dialogue 
will be shaped by values as much as by empirical data.
Policy recommendations
Generational inequities in public finance are more likely to be 
ignored if not monitored. It is time for Canadian governments to 
publish routine reports that feature data about the elderly/non-el-
derly ratio of spending changes; trends in tax rates, and taxes paid 
in allegiance to the golden rule; along with metrics that assess the 
relative ability to pay of various age cohorts. Because of concerns 
about government deficit and debt as metrics of fiscal sustain-
ability, offices of Parliament should also perform fiscal gap and 
generational accounting every three years as the European Union 
now does for member countries (Kotlikoff 2017:59).
When evidence emerges of intergenerational imbalance, the search 
for public finance responses should target cleavages between age 
groups. A current cleavage is the gap between home prices and 
earnings, which reduces the ability to pay among young adults, 
while driving wealth accumulation for many seniors. An extensive 
international literature observes that residential property often en-
joys favourable tax treatment (Freebairn 2016; O’Sullivan/Gibb 
2012; Cho/Francis 2011), including in Canada (Boadway 2015: 
261). For example, capital gains from the sale of principal residenc-
es are not counted as income for tax purposes, representing a feder-
al tax expenditure of $7 billion annually (Government of Canada 
2017:39), and corresponding reductions for provincial coffers. Si-
multaneously, annual revenue from municipal property taxation is 
down $4.4 billion as a share of GDP compared to 1976.58
Since all provinces have infrastructure to assess annually the market 
value of homes, shifting the balance of revenue generation toward 
housing wealth is an optimal starting point for renewing commit-
ment to intergenerational justice in Canadian public finance.59 
This tax shift would target the primary trend creating a socio-eco-
nomic fissure between older and younger citizens. It also taps older 
Canadians with financial means for additional taxation in recog-
nition that they disproportionately accumulated housing wealth 
over the last four decades; and their generation passes down larger 
public medical care bills to their children than their parents passed 
down to them. Tax deferment could accommodate “home-rich but 
income-poor” citizens by postponing collection of new annual tax-
es on high-value homes until the sale of the property. On top of 
funding medical care for the ageing population, additional taxation 
of housing wealth would preserve fiscal capacity for governments to 
address new social risks for younger Canadians, and reduce incen-
tives for speculative demand on real estate to cool down housing 
prices. That could be a win-win-win for all generations.
Notes
1 Statistics Canada (2017a): CANSIM Table 051-0001.
2 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (n.d.).
3 Such omissions undermine the utility of comparative projects, be-
cause medical care spending is consumed disproportionately in lat-
er life, while education is consumed earlier. Likewise, the omission 
of tax expenditures means one country’s baby bonus will be count-
ed as a traditional budget expense when another country’s child tax 
credit will not, although the two are functionally equivalent.
4 For example, Bradshaw/Holmes 2013.
5 Revenue data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM Table 
380-0080. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM 
Table 380-0063.
6 Revenue data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM Table 
380-0080. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM 
Table 380-0063.
7 United Nations (2002) assemblies on ageing emphasise the 
rights of older persons to independence, participation, care, 
Older Canadians today […] generally faced more favour-
able socioeconomic circumstances as younger adults 
in 1976 than do younger Canadians now. Older Canadi-
ans started with higher median earnings, which could 
stretch further when paying for rent, saving a down 
payment, and paying a mortgage. Today’s seniors also 
inherited smaller government debts as young people, 
and reduced their ecological footprint at just one-third 
of the rate that young adults must now do.
It is time for Canadian governments to publish routine 
reports that feature data about the elderly/non-elderly 
ratio of spending changes; trends in tax rates, and taxes 
paid in allegiance to the golden rule; along with metrics 
that assess the relative ability to pay of various age 
cohorts.
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self-fulfilment and dignity, while the United Nations (1989) con-
vention on the rights of the child invokes special protections for 
children, and implies investment in their guardians.
8 For a summary of this literature, see the Commission on the 
Social Determinants of Health 2008.
9 By examining spending on Canadians under the age of 45, I 
largely avoid the problem of apportioning benefits between par-
ents and children. Tenuous assumptions would otherwise be re-
quired when calculating the portion of cash transfers to families 
from which parents benefit apart from their children, or what 
quantity of childcare and school expenditures provide early devel-
opment opportunities for children by comparison with the por-
tion that supports parents to connect to the labour market, etc. As 
Lynch (2006:20) observes, there is “considerable overlap between 
the wellbeing of children and non-elderly adults, and the scant 
similarity between the wellbeing of seniors and of their children’s 
and grandchildren’s age groups.”
10 The CPI figure for 1976 is 31.1 The CPI figure for 2016 is 
128.4. See Statistics Canada (2018c): CANSIM Table 326-0021.
11 2016 tax calculations rely on SPSD/M version 26.1 and 1976 
calculations rely on version 8.1. Since the released version of the 
latter only included years 1984 to 2005, Statistics Canada staff 
updated the parameters for this study to reflect the 1976 tax struc-
ture for federal and provincial taxes. The updates were provided 
by Laurie Plager (laurie.plager@canada.ca) on 19 January 2018. 
The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulations 
were prepared by the author, and the responsibility for the use 
and interpretation of these data is entirely that of the author.
12 Some may lament that this study does not perform generation-
al accounting (GA). Developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, Kotlikoff 
(1991) and colleagues, it is a methodology widely used among 
economists to study whether a government’s current fiscal pol-
icy is balanced in terms of taxes owed and benefits received be-
tween contemporary and future generations, assuming current 
policy persists indefinitely. If there is imbalance, GA permits es-
timation of the scale of revenue and/or expenditure adaptations 
needed to restore balance. The method is motivated by critique 
that con ventional concepts of deficit and debt “do not consti-
tute  meaningful measurements of the fiscal burden being foisted 
on young and future generations” because of arbitrary account-
ing practices that keep some liabilities off government books 
(Kotlikoff 2017: 60). 
In their recent GA study of pension reform in Norway, Germany 
and Poland, Laub and Hagist (2017: 72) observe that the suc-
cess of policy adaptations to promote intergenerational justice “is 
highly dependent on whether people accept them, and adapt to 
them or not. Thus a transparent reform process and a broad ap-
proval of reform steps taken” are necessary for the revisions to 
be politically viable. While GA can contribute to this process by 
providing a measure of the fiscal gap between contemporary and 
future generations, they conclude “it has to be complemented by 
other assessments” that help to bring along the public and deci-
sion-makers. This study falls in the “other” category, by focusing 
on a retrospective, descriptive analysis of changes to public finance 
so that Canadians can better understand trends that produced the 
current suite of intergenerational policies. As Kotlikoff (2017: 57) 
acknowledges in his review of GA scholarship over recent decades, 
“how well current generations fared in the past may matter for 
assessing the justice of current generation policy.”
13 Revenue data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM Table 
380-0080. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM 
Table 380-0063.
14 2016 age estimates for medical spending are calculated in three 
steps. The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) 
provides per capita data about provincial medical spending re-
ported for five-year age ranges (2017: Table E.1.18.2). The most 
recent are for 2015. I first apply 2015 per capita data to the Ca-
nadian population in 2016 to estimate total projected spending. 
Second, I calculate the percentage of this projected spending for 
Canadians under the age of 45 (29.2%) and aged 65+ (46.7%). 
Third, I attribute these percentages to the $163.3 billion actually 
forecasted as total public spending on medical care for Canada in 
2016 (CIHI 2017: Table A.3.3.1). These calculations reflect aver-
age per capita figures of $2,314 per person under 45 and $12,913 
per person aged 65+ (See Table 1). GDP data are from Statistics 
Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063.
I calculate the age distribution of medical spending in 1976 in the 
same way, with one exception. CIHI data about per capita use of 
medical care date back to 1998 (2017: Table E.1.1.2). To estimate 
per capita spending in 1976, I calculate the average annual change 
between 1998 and 2014 for each five-year age group, and attribute 
that average change to each year between 1976 and 1997. These 
figures are applied as step 1 to the population in 1976 to estimate 
total projected spending. I calculate in step 2 the percentage of 
projected spending on Canadians under the age of 45 (43.5%) 
and 65+ (36.7%). I then apply these percentages to the total 
spending of $10.8 billion in 1976 reported by CIHI (2017: Table 
A.3.3.1). These calculations reflect average per capita assumptions 
of $1,143 per person under 45 and $8,322 per person aged 65+ 
after adjusting for inflation into 2016 dollars (See Table 1).
As a sensitivity analysis for the 1976 calculation, I change step 
1 by attributing the per capita spending values in 1998 to the 
population distribution in 1976. This sensitivity analysis predicts 
45.4% of spending in 1976 went to those under the age of 45, 
and 33.9% went to those aged 65+. These predictions reflect as-
sumptions of $1,194 per person under 45 and $7,690 per person 
aged 65+. (See Table 1).
The sensitivity analysis suggests that primary figures underesti-
mate the annual increase in medical care spending for Canadi-
an seniors by $3 billion in aggregate, and over $600 per capita. 
Similarly, the sensitivity analysis suggests that primary figures un-
derestimate a decline in spending for the under-45 population 
by approximately $2 billion in aggregate, and overestimate the 
resulting per capita increase by around $50. 
15 Old Age Security data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CAN-
SIM Table 380-0080. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): 
CANSIM Table 380-0063.
16 Canada and Quebec public pension data from Statistics Canada 
(2018a): CANSIM Table 380-0080. GDP data from Statistics 
Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063. Legislation requires 
that C/QPP revenues remain separate from other taxation so that 
arms-length boards invest prepayments to fill the gap between 
contributions and projected expenditures. 
17 2016 data about post-secondary credentials are from Statis-
tics Canada (2017b). 1976 data are from two sources. Statistics 
Canada (1978a): “Table 30. Population 15 years and older not 
attending school full time by age groups and sex, showing level 
of schooling, for Canada and provinces 1976.” Statistics Canada 
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(1978b): “Table 14. Population 15 Years and Over by Age Groups 
and School Attendance, Showing Labour Force Activity and Sex, 
for Canada and Provinces, 1976.” Due to data limitations, note 
that the 1976 calculations assume (i) all people in post-second-
ary in that year have a certificate/degree, and (ii) all people over 
the age of 35 in post-secondary fall in the under-age-45 cohort. 
These assumptions overestimate the percentage of people under 
the age of 45 who had post-secondary credentials in 1976, and 
thus underestimate the increase in the proportion of people under 
45 with post-secondary credentials as of 2016. The latter under-
estimation means the per capita decrease in spending on post-sec-
ondary as of 2016 is likely larger than reported in Table 1.
18 Post-secondary spending data from Statistics Canada (2018d): 
CANSIM Table 380-0081. GDP data from Statistics Canada 
(2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063.
19 Labour force data from Statistics Canada (2017c): CANSIM 
Table 282-0002.
20 Childcare expenditure data are from Friendly/Grady/Mac-
donald/et al. (2015: 136). GDP data are from Statistics Canada 
(2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063. Since comprehensive data 
on childcare spending do not exist for 1976, I estimate spending 
based on the province of British Columbia, and then adjust for 
the portion of the national population represented by BC in 1976 
to generate a national estimate. BC data are from Government 
of British Columbia 1977: D.41. The $3.6 billion increase is ap-
proximately $10 billion less than Kershaw and Anderson (2009) 
estimate is required to build a high-quality system, and why Can-
ada ranks among the bottom of OECD countries for investment 
in early childhood education (Petersson/Mariscal/Ishi 2017: 19).
21 The data reviewed in this study are in keeping with Barer, 
 Evans and Hertzman (1995: 194), who find that population age-
ing alone accounts for little of the increased utilisation of health 
care by seniors in Canada. Utilisation is driven more by the fact 
that the health system is doing more to and for seniors than in 
the past, “suggesting that the appropriate care of elderly people 
should be a central issue for health care policy and management.”
22 These findings are consistent with Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010), 
who report that dramatic demand-side demographic trends in-
fluence public finance relatively little in advanced democracies, 
although the historical timing of when governments begin ad-
dressing social risks shapes spending patterns. 
23 Debt data from Statistics Canada (n.d. a): CANSIM Table 
378-0073 and Statistics Canada (2018e): CANSIM Table 378-
0121. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 
380-0063.
24 Elementary and secondary school spending data from Statis-
tics Canada (2017d): CANSIM Table 478-0014. GDP data from 
Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063. 
25 Parental leave spending data in 2016 from Government of 
Canada (n.d.): Chart 2. Parental leave data in 1976 from Cana-
dian Tax Foundation 1979: Table 7-9. GDP data from Statistics 
Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063. 
26 Statistics Canada (2017a): CANSIM Table 051-0001. There 
are 3.2 million more people under the age of 45, 5.6 million more 
people age 45-64, and 4 million more seniors.
27 Revenue data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM 
Table 380-0080. Population data from Statistics Canada (2017a): 
CANSIM Table 051-0001.
28 GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Ta-
ble 380-0063. Population data from Statistics Canada (2017a): 
CANSIM Table 051-0001.
29 Medical care calculations are based on Canadian Institute of 
Health Information (2017) data about total health spending by 
governments, and analysis of per capita health spending by age 
group. See note 32 for further detail. The per capita figures ac-
count for an estimated 55% increase in use of publicly-paid med-
ical care services per person aged 65+ between 1976 and 2016 
(from $8,322 to $12,913); and an estimated increase of 102% per 
person under the age of 45 (from $1,143 to $2,314). 
30 Per capita figures for childcare and parental leave in Table 1 
account for the increased demographic demand for these pro-
grammes as a result of the 54% increase in labour force participa-
tion among women age 25-44 between 1976 and 2016. Similar-
ly, the figure for post-secondary accounts for the 149% increase 
in the share of Canadians age 25-44 who earned post-secondary 
credentials by comparison with 1976. Even if these adjustments 
to per capita spending on younger Canadians are not made, the 
elderly/non-elderly (under the age of 45) ratio of change in social 
spending is 2.6 to 1; and the $4,591 rise in medical care spending 
per senior is on its own larger than the $4,299 increase in spend-
ing on the entire suite of programmes for younger generations 
($4,299 = $9,420 - $5,122). See Table 1 for further detail.
31 Post-secondary spending data from Statistics Canada (2018d): 
CANSIM Table 380-0081. GDP data from Statistics Canada 
(2018b): CANSIM Table 380-0063.
32 The Canadian Institute for Health Information has reported 
the age pattern in health care consumption from 1998 onward 
(with a 2-3 year data lag). These data consistently reveal escalation 
in medical spending over the life course. For example, the 2015 
figures reveal less than $2,000 in spending per person age 1-24, 
and $2,000 to $3,000 per person age 25-49. By aged 65-69, the 
figure is around $6,600, and rises to over $29,000 for Canadians 
90+. The one exception to this trend is spending on infants, ap-
proximately $11,000, reflecting the costs associated with birthing. 
For further discussion of the age pattern in Canada, see also For-
get et al. (2008). 
33 In keeping with per capita reductions in government spending 
on university, college and the trades, annual undergraduate tui-
tion rose from $2,332 in 1976 to $6,373 in 2016 (Statistics Can-
ada (2017e): CANSIM Table 477-0077; and Statistics Canada 
(n.d. g): Tuition Living Accommodation Costs (TLAC) Standard 
Table 8E.1a) Weighted average tuition fees for full-time Canadian 
Undergraduate students by province and Canada total, in current 
dollars, 1972-2006). This finding is consistent with Cheung et 
al. (2012) who report that tuition fees in Canada increased 40% 
between 1997 and 2011, and that Canadian public investment 
in tertiary education provides a low level of grant funding, and 
a high level of loan funding, by comparison with the OECD av-
erage.
34 This observation is especially important in Canada, where 
public funding for medical care is relatively high by international 
standards, but purchases below-average access to doctors and di-
agnostics, along with well-remunerated physicians (OECD 2017: 
156, 168, 170).
35 All population estimates are from Statistics Canada (2017a): 
CANSIM Table 051-0001.
36 An optimal analysis would examine age patterns in revenue 
from taxation of individual income and goods/services. Canadian 
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data do not permit age analyses of the latter. However, it is likely 
that goods/services taxation is down for most or all age groups, 
because the tax mix has shifted away from taxes on goods/services 
in favour of additional income taxation. Income taxes represented 
28.5% of total government revenue in 1976 and 30.3% of total 
revenue in 2016. By contrast, taxes on goods/services represented 
33.8% of total revenue in 1976 and 30.9% in 2016. This shift 
represents a $27.4 billion increase in taxation of individual in-
come (measured as a share of GDP), compared to a $7.2 billion 
reduction in taxation of goods/services. (Revenue data from Sta-
tistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM Table 380-0080. Population 
data from Statistics Canada (2017a): CANSIM Table 051-0001).
GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Table 380-
0063.
37 Statistics Canada (n.d. b): Data Table, Total Income percentiles.
38 Taxes owed are calculated using versions 8.1 and 26.1 of Statis-
tics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPS-
D/M). See note 27 for further information.
39 These findings are consistent with Evans, Hertzman and 
 Morgan (2007: 302-303), who report that “several provincial 
governments have in the last decade made significant cuts to their 
income tax rates, and then cut expenditures to restore budget 
 balance. Since cutting health spending is so politically charged, 
they have chosen to cut other programs more.”
40 Larger income tax transfers from young people to seniors 
 reflect in part that there were nearly seven workers for every 
 Canadian aged 65+ in 1976, while there are now fewer than four, 
and projections anticipate fewer than three in the decades ahead 
(Statistics Canada 2014).
41 Statistics Canada (n.d. c).
42 Low income data from Statistics Canada (2018f ): CANSIM 
Table 206-0041.
43 Median income data from Statistics Canada (2018g): 
 CANSIM Table 206-0052. I examine five-year time periods from 
1976-1981 and the first half of the current decade to dampen the 
influence of the business cycle on time comparisons.
44 Full-time, full-year median income data from Statistics Can-
ada (n.d. d): Custom Table C856285. Younger Canadians who 
work full-time, full-year earn less today despite the trend toward 
more education discussed earlier. 70% of 25-44 year-olds now 
have post-secondary credentials compared to 28% four decades 
ago. While people with post-secondary still earn more on average 
than those without, more recent labour market entrants do not 
enjoy as large a return for their post-secondary investments as did 
graduates in the past (see Beaudry/Green 2000. Moos 2014). 
45 Lower median income for Canadians under the age of 45 cou-
pled with higher median income for those over 45 are consistent 
with the stagnation in Canadian earnings reported by Rouillard 
and Rouillard (2015) since 1980. These age patterns are also in 
line with evidence from Chen, Ostrovsky and Piraino (2017) who 
find that research from the late 1990s overestimated intergenera-
tional income mobility in Canada.
46 Canadian Real Estate Association (n.d.): Custom Table. 
 Average home prices today reflect the fact that many more young 
people now purchase homes in condominiums or apartments 
without yards, or in suburbs that require longer commutes than 
the past (Kershaw/Minh 2016).
47 The ratio increases from 4:1 to 9:1 when mean full-time, full-year 
earnings are swapped for the median figures reported in this section. 
48 Guided by Rea et al. (2008) and Statistics Canada, I assume 
that the typical Canadian trying to buy into the housing market 
can save 15% of their income for a down payment on top of 
rent or other shelter payment. This rate of saving is more aggres-
sive than the 10% rate assumed by CityLab (2012) when mak-
ing similar calculations for US cities. My findings are consistent 
with Moos (2014: 2096), who reports for younger Canadians that 
“Housing costs are higher and more income is required to attain 
a similar kind of housing status to those of previous cohorts.” 
See also Cheung (2014), who reports that housing prices have 
increased significantly over the past decade, requiring first-time 
home-buyers to spend more of their income to purchase homes, 
and coinciding with a shortage in rental housing in several cities.
49 Building on the analysis of work required to save a 20% down 
payment, I calculate mortgage payments for a loan that equals 
80% of the value of an average-priced home. Average home price 
data from Canadian Real Estate Association (n.d.): Custom Table. 
Interest rate data from Statistics Canada (n.d. e): CANSIM Table 
176-0043. Interest payments calculated using the Vancity Credit 
Union (n.d.) Mortgage Calculator.
50 Rental data from Statistics Canada (2017f ): CANSIM Table 
027-0040. 
51 Housing wealth data for 1977 from Statistics Canada 1977. 
Data for 2016 from Statistics Canada (2017g): CANSIM Table 
205-0002.
52 Home ownership is down 12%-14% for people under 45 to-
day by comparison with 1977, while ownership is up 7%-10% 
for Canadians aged 55 and older. Home ownership data for 
1977 from Statistics Canada 1977. Data for 2016 from Statistics 
 Canada (2017g): CANSIM Table 205-0002.
53 These findings about wealth accumulation via increased hous-
ing capital are in line with Lemieux and Riddell (2016), who 
report that the share of national income in Canada received by 
workers has dropped when compared to income received by own-
ers of capital.
54 Vanhuysse (2013) calculates the debt per child. Consistent 
with my focus on the generations raising children, I calculate the 
debt per person under the age of 45. As Kotlikoff (2017) rightly 
critiques, public debt suffers from arbitrary accounting decisions 
that limit its accuracy as a metric of fiscal sustainability. Still, as 
the dominant fiscal debt measure of which the public is aware, 
an increasing level of debt per capita signals lesser prioritization 
of fiscal sustainability among decision-makers accountable to the 
public. It is therefore meaningful to examine if lesser priority is 
given to sustainability, even if the metric may not be an accurate 
measure of the actual level of (un)sustainability. 
55 Debt data from Statistics Canada (n.d. a): CANSIM Table 
378-0073 and Statistics Canada (2018e): CANSIM Table 378-
0121. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): CANSIM Ta-
ble 380-0063. Population data from Statistics Canada (2017a): 
CANSIM Table 051-0001.
56 Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Working Group III (2001: 89) reports that greenhouse gas emis-
sions must fall below two tonnes per person to avoid severe  damage 
to the climate. In order to achieve this reduction by 2050, decar-
bonisation plans could have been phased in more gradually in 1976 
than today. At that time, the International Energy Association 
(2017: CO2/population) estimated Canada emitted 16.59 tonnes 
per person, which required annual reductions of 0.2 tonnes per 
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year. By this logic, per capita emissions should now be under nine 
tonnes – not the 15.32 tonnes recorded by the IEA in 2015. Given 
the slow pace of adaptation in previous decades, carbon-reduction 
must now occur at twice the pace, dropping 0.4 tonnes per year. 
57 Statistics Canada (n.d. f ): CANSIM Table 102-0512.
58 Property tax data from Statistics Canada (2018a): CANSIM 
Table 380-0080. GDP data from Statistics Canada (2018b): 
CANSIM Table 380-0063. 
59 Support for including home wealth more in calculations of taxes 
owed or fees required to pay for the costs of population ageing is 
also growing in Australia (Ong 2016) and the UK (Searle/McCol-
lum 2014, O'Sullivan/Gibb 2012), given the substantial escalation 
in home prices experienced in those countries in recent decades. In 
addition, several commentators speak of the value of recurrent taxa-
tion of property wealth for efficiency reasons (Wood/Ong/Cigdem 
2016, Eerola/Maattanen 2013, Evans 2012), observing that shel-
tering of housing wealth accelerates investment in real estate at the 
expense of capital investment in more productive sectors.
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